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INTRODUCTION
On February 20th, 2007, Adriana Leon was awakened at 5:00
a.m. when armed agents burst into her room and pulled the blan-
kets off her and her four-year-old son.1  The agents gathered Adri-
ana’s family in an office space, blocked the exits to the area, and
threatened her with their weapons when she attempted to contact a
lawyer.2
On September 27th, 2007, Peggy Delarosa-Delgado was asleep
in her bed at 6:00 a.m. when more than a dozen agents pushed past
her high-school aged son to enter her home.3  Ms. Delarosa-Del-
gado awoke to find her family frightened and distraught after U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)4 agents had gath-
ered her three children into the living room and threatened a
houseguest with a gun.5
1. Nina Bernstein, U.S. Raid on an Immigrant Household Deepens Anger and
Mistrust, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2007, at B1 [hereinafter Bernstein, U.S. Raid].
2. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 116-17, 120-22, 124-25, Aguilar v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, No. 07-8224 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Aguilar
Amended Complaint].
3. Nina Bernstein, Citizens Caught up in Immigration Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2007, at B5 [hereinafter Bernstein, Citizens].
4. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), part of the Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”), took over the interior enforcement responsibilities of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) in March 2003. U.S. IMMIGRA-
TION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE FISCAL YEAR 2006 ANNUAL REPORT:  PRO-
TECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND UPHOLDING PUBLIC SAFETY 1-2 (2006); April
McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforce-
ment of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2004).
5. Bernstein, Citizens, supra note 3.
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These women were not criminals, nor were they living in a totali-
tarian state.  Rather, they were U.S. citizens whose homes were
mistakenly targeted in raids by ICE.
In recent years, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
has increasingly expanded its enforcement focus from patrol of the
border to efforts to apprehend illegal immigrants already within
the United States.6  The Leons and the Delarosa-Delgados were
targets of such interior enforcement efforts.  DHS targeted the
Leon home pursuant to “Operation Return to Sender.”  The pur-
pose of this initiative, which began in May 2006, is to apprehend
“immigration fugitives”: people who remain in this country despite
a final order of deportation.7  The Delarosa-Delgado home was a
target of “Operation Community Shield,” a program that began in
February, 2005 and seeks to remove illegal immigrants who are
also gang members.8  These enforcement programs have been the
subject of criticism and multiple federal lawsuits9 because ICE
agents are instructed to carry out these initiatives by targeting pri-
vate homes without judicial warrants.10
ICE claimed authority to target the Leon and Delarosa-Delgado
homes based on administrative arrest warrants.11  Such warrants
need not be issued by a judge, but rather can be issued by forty-
nine different officials within DHS.12  In order to secure a standard
administrative warrant, an ICE officer must present such an official
6. See Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior
Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2008).
7. Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Arrests 128 Immi-
gration Violators in Statewide Enforcement Operation (Apr. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070402newark.htm.
8. Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Workers Caught in a Net Cast for Gangs, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 41 [hereinafter Bernstein, Immigrant Workers]; see U.S. Im-
migration & Customs Enforcement, Operation Community Shield, http://www.ice.gov/
pi/investigations/comshield/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
9. See, e.g., Arias v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL
1827604 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008); Mancha v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
No. 06-2650, 2007 WL 4287766 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2007); Aguilar v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, No. 07-8224 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2007); Editorial, Stop the
Raids, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A28; Tyche Hendricks, The Human Face of Immi-
gration Raids in Bay Area:  Arrests of Parents Can Deeply Traumatize Children Caught
in the Fray, Experts Argue, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2007, at A1.
10. See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government’s Motion to Dismiss
at 12, Aguilar, No. 07-8224 [hereinafter Aguilar Memorandum of Law]; Bernstein,
Immigrant Workers, supra note 8, at 41; Bernstein, U.S. Raid, supra note 1; Elliot R
Spagat, Immigrants Are ‘Collateral Arrests’, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 6, 2007, at
3A.
11. See Nina Bernstein, Raids Were a Shambles, Nassau Complains to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at B1; Bernstein, U.S. Raid, supra note 1. R
12. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(e)(2) (2008).
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with a Notice to Appear for the person sought, a document that
sets forth the facts and law justifying an arrest for a violation of
immigration law.13  ICE came to the Leon household with a war-
rant to arrest Adriana’s estranged ex-husband.14  Despite the five
years since their divorce, the order of protection she had against
him, and her subsequent marriage, ICE agents sought to execute
the warrant at the Leon home.15  For her part, Ms. Delarosa-Del-
gado had never seen or heard of the person who ICE sought to
arrest in her home.16  However, during the summer of 2006, Ms.
Delarosa-Delgado had been the victim of another pre-dawn raid
searching for the same person.17
Unfortunately, the experiences of the Leons and the Delarosa-
Delgados are not isolated incidents.  In fact, the Delarosa-Delgado
raid was part of a series of raids conducted in Nassau County dur-
ing the last week of September 2007.18  During the course of these
raids, ICE agents’ behavior prompted Nassau County Executive
Thomas Suozzi to write a letter to Department of Homeland Se-
curity Secretary Michael Chertoff calling for an investigation of the
enforcement operation.19  One of the major complaints in the letter
was that ICE agents targeted homes without “current in-
tel[ligence]” as to whether the people they were seeking could ac-
tually be found in those homes.20  Specifically, although the
purpose of the raid was allegedly to apprehend illegal aliens who
were also gang members,21 on several occasions ICE agents ne-
glected to verify the names and addresses of their targets with the
local police department’s Gang Intelligence Files.22  ICE agents
also used other unreliable information.  For example, ICE agents
used a childhood photograph in their attempts to locate one
twenty-eight-year-old suspect.23  As a result of this lack of current
13. United States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2006).
14. Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 127-28.
15. Id. ¶¶ 129-30; Bernstein, U.S. Raid, supra note 1. R
16. Bernstein, Citizens, supra note 3. R
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. Letter from Thomas Suozzi, Executive, Nassau County, to Michael Chertoff,
Sec’y, Dept. of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.nassaucountyny.
gov/agencies/CountyExecutive/NewsRelease/2007/10-2-2007.html.
20. Id.
21. Letter from Lawrence W. Mulvey, Police Comm’r, Nassau County, to Joseph
A. Palmese, Resident Agent-in-Charge, ICE Office of Investigation, Bohemia N.Y.
(Sept. 27, 2007) (attached as exhibit to Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2)
(on file with author).
22. Letter from Thomas Suozzi to Michael Chertoff, supra note 19. R
23. See id.
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information, ICE agents raided many homes that, like Ms. De-
larosa-Delgado’s, should not have been targets of the investigation.
In fact, of the eighty-two people arrested, only nine were targets of
the operation.24  The ICE agents’ aggressive attitude in the De-
larosa-Delgado home was not unique.  Suozzi’s letter complains
that ICE agents maintained a “cowboy” attitude and even drew
guns on local police during the course of the raids.25
One question raised by these raids is whether targeting and en-
tering homes without court-ordered warrants raises problems
under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable
searches and seizures.”26  The Fourth Amendment applies to civil
as well as criminal law enforcement, and courts recognize that both
citizens and non-citizens are entitled to some degree of Fourth
Amendment protection in the immigration enforcement context.27
Furthermore, entry of the home is characterized as the “chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”28
Therefore, interior enforcement efforts that target the home with-
out judicial warrants raise serious concerns, especially in light of
anecdotal evidence of indiscriminate targeting of homes and co-
erced consent.
This Note argues that additional protections are necessary to en-
sure that ICE does not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of
those they target and those who get swept up in their enforcement
efforts.  This is particularly true with initiatives such as “Operation
Return to Sender” and “Operation Community Shield” because
they are carried out in private homes, the traditional sphere of
greatest Fourth Amendment protection.  The experiences of the
Leons, the Delarosa-Delgados, and many others like them, as well
as official reports of ICE misconduct, indicate that there are insuf-
ficient safeguards in place to ensure that ICE’s enforcement efforts
comply with the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this Note details the particular ICE practices that indi-
viduals, community groups, and scholars have questioned on
Fourth Amendment grounds.  Part II then examines the legal
framework through which this behavior can be analyzed to evalu-
ate its compliance with the Fourth Amendment.  Part II first de-
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
28. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (quoting United States v. U.S.
Dist. Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
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scribes the special protections for the home afforded in the
criminal context, then outlines the distinctions courts draw be-
tween the criminal and immigration contexts for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.  Because of these distinctions, Fourth Amendment
standards for ICE conduct must be independently evaluated based
on the particular privacy interests at stake in the immigration en-
forcement context.  Part II then reviews the case law that estab-
lishes Fourth Amendment standards in the immigration
enforcement context.  Because there have been few cases challeng-
ing immigration enforcement behavior in the home, the discussion
centers around standards for workplace raids and vehicle stops and
searches.  Part III applies the standards set forth in the vehicle and
workplace contexts to the home, arguing that because the Fourth
Amendment interests at stake in the home are greater than in
workplaces or vehicles, the standards set forth in those contexts are
the minimal standards that should be applied to the home.  This
argument finds further support in ICE’s own internal guidelines,
which contain similar requirements.  Application of vehicle and
workplace standards and ICE’s own guidelines to ICE’s current
home enforcement scheme reveals that these minimal standards
are not respected.  Finally, Part III concludes that by enforcing
standards already in place in the immigration enforcement scheme,
ICE could significantly curb Fourth Amendment violations in the
home.
I. ICE’S CURRENT PRACTICES
The stories told in the Introduction above show the general mo-
dus operandi of home raids pursuant to “Operation Return to
Sender” or “Operation Community Shield.”  Commentators, advo-
cacy groups, and scholars have taken issue with a number of ICE’s
home enforcement practices on Fourth Amendment grounds.29
The first practice that raises concern is targeting homes with little
or no evidence that a subject of the search resides at the home in
question.  This indiscriminate targeting is not limited to the com-
munities described in the opening stories.  Across the country,
29. See, e.g., Arias v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, No. 07-1959, 2008 WL
1827604 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2008); Mancha v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement,
No. 06-2650, 2007 WL 4287766 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2007); Aguilar v. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, No. 07-8224 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 20, 2007); Raquel Aldana,
Of Katz and “Aliens”:  Privacy Expectations and the Immigration Raids, 41 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 1081 (2008); Editorial, Stop the Raids, supra note 9; Hendricks, supra note R
9. R
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news reports and legal complaints tell stories of people whose
homes were raided pursuant to warrants containing inaccurate or
outdated information.30  In other cases, it is not clear that ICE pos-
sesses a warrant at all because ICE agents refuse to produce one,31
or do not disclose the name of the person they are trying to
apprehend.32
The effects of targeting homes based on little or no evidence are
evidenced by the large numbers of “collateral arrests” by ICE na-
tionwide.33  For instance, in April 2007, ICE reported the arrests of
359 people in a series of raids in the San Diego region, only sixty-
two of whom were targets of the operation.34  In December 2006,
ICE reported the arrests of forty-five people in Austin and Albert
Lea, Minnesota, only nine of whom were targets of the operation.35
Of the 18,149 people arrested in “Operation Return to Sender”
between May 2006, when the program began, and February of
2007, 37% were not initial targets of the operation.36  This percent-
age of “collateral arrests” is even larger in certain areas of the
country.37  For instance, “collateral arrests” made up 59% of all
arrests in Dallas and El Paso, Texas, 54% in New York City,  and
57% in San Diego.38
Another aspect of ICE’s home enforcement initiatives that raises
Fourth Amendment concerns is entry of homes without consent.
Some news articles and legal complaints report that ICE agents
have physically broken into homes in order to locate illegal immi-
30. See, e.g., Bernstein, Citizens, supra note 3; Sandra Forester, Immigration Raids R
Spark Anger in Sun Valley Area, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 21, 2007, at 1; Hendricks,
supra note 9. R
31. See, e.g., Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 136-39, 143-45, 162-65
(“After she requested to see a warrant, one of the ICE agents asked Nelly her name.
Nelly Responded, ‘Nelly Amaya.’  The ICE agent started laughing and said, “Nelly
Amaya, this is your arrest order.  You are under arrest.”).
32. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
and Damages ¶ 46, Arias, 2008 WL 1827604 (No. 07-1959) [hereinafter Arias Com-
plaint]; First Amended Complaint ¶ 30, Mancha, 2007 WL 4287766 (No. 06-2650)
[hereinafter Mancha Complaint].
33. See Spagat, supra note 10. R
34. See Leslie Berestein, ‘I Want My Parents . . . Back’:  When Relatives Are De-
ported, Families Can’t Do Much but Cope, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 28,
2007, at B-1.
35. See Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Arrests 45
Fugitives and Immigration Violators in Albert Lea and Austin (Dec. 12, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/061212bloomington.htm.
36. See Spagat, supra note 10. R
37. See id.
38. Id.
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grants.39  However, even in cases where a resident opens the door
for ICE agents, the validity of this consent is debatable.  ICE
agents frequently engage in coercive behavior,40 are routinely
armed and wearing bulletproof vests,41 sometimes announce them-
selves as “police,”42 often arrive in groups of at least six,43 and do
not inform residents of the home that they can refuse consent.44
These factors are especially significant because ICE frequently
targets residents who have poor English skills, are particularly in-
timidated by law enforcement, and are not aware of their legal
right to refuse consent.45
A final concern is that, although ICE does not obtain search
warrants in initiatives such as “Operation Return to Sender” and
“Operation Community Shield,”46 ICE agents will frequently
search throughout the home in an effort to locate illegal immi-
grants.47  Indeed, after gaining entry, ICE claims the right to ques-
tion every person in the home about their immigration status48 and
has been known to search bedrooms, basements, and even dresser
39. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 149, 223, 268; Mancha
Complaint, supra note 32, ¶ 68; Samuel G. Freedman, Immigration Raid Leaves Sense
of Dread in Hispanic Students, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at B7.
40. Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 107, 205, 209, 255 (describing
various coercive behaviors such as pounding on door so hard that the doorframe came
loose, shining bright lights into the home, and pointing a gun at resident’s chest after
the door was opened); Mancha Complaint, supra note 32, ¶ 58 (indicating that one
agent yelled that ICE would “break down the door” or throw gas in the home if
resident did not open the door); Cathy Dyson, ICE Raid in Stafford Stunning to Fam-
ily, FREE LANCE STAR (Fredericksburg, Va.), Apr. 29, 2007, http://
www.fredericksburg.com/News/FLS/2007/042007/04292007/279583 (after repeated
banging and doorknob jiggling by an agent in a bulletproof vest, resident of home told
her husband, “he’d better open the door before the police knocked it down”).
41. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 104, 154; Mancha Com-
plaint, supra note 32, ¶ 27; Dyson supra note 40. R
42. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 232, 240; Arias Complaint,
supra note 32, ¶ 44; Mancha Complaint, supra note 32, ¶ 26.
43. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 276; Arias Complaint, supra
note 32, ¶ 45; Mancha Complaint, supra note 32, ¶¶ 28, 57; Dyson supra note 40; R
Forester supra note 30. R
44. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 110, 151.
45. See Steve Helfand, Desensitization to Border Violence & the Bivens Remedy to
Effectuate Systemic Change, 12 LA RAZA L. J. 87, 107 (2001); Jenny Schulz, Grappling
with a Meaty Issue:  IIRARA’s Effect on Immigrants in the Meatpacking Industry, 2 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 137, 153-54 (1998) (explaining that even legal immigrants fear
government retaliation against themselves or their families).
46. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. R
47. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 115-16, 243, 249; Arias
Complaint, supra note 32, ¶¶ 47, 48; Mancha Complaint, supra note 32, ¶ 60.
48. See Leah Rae, Mount Kisco Immigration Raids Are Among Many Across U.S.,
JOURNAL NEWS (White Plains, N.Y.), Apr. 8, 2007 (on file with author).
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drawers while looking for additional residents.49  The collateral ar-
rest statistics described above50 provide further evidence that these
operations contemplate apprehension of as many illegal immi-
grants as possible, not just the persons listed on particular arrest
warrants.
II. SEARCHING FOR A STANDARD FOR HOME ENFORCEMENT:
FOURTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER CONTEXTS
In order to evaluate ICE’s compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment in carrying out initiatives such as “Operation Return to
Sender” and “Operation Community Shield,” immigration en-
forcement in the home must be located in the spectrum of Fourth
Amendment standards that govern different law enforcement
schemes.  The Fourth Amendment provides that “the people” shall
have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.”51  This protection is under-
stood to extend to federal, state, and local government activity.52
The Fourth Amendment has generally been interpreted to mean
that a warrant or probable cause is required for searches and
seizures, and that valid warrants may only issue upon a showing of
probable cause.53  Probable cause “exists when known facts and
circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable pru-
dence in the belief that an offense has been or is being commit-
ted.”54  In certain situations, when government interests outweigh
the individual privacy interest at stake, searches and seizures can
be based on “reasonable suspicion,” rather than probable cause.55
Reasonable suspicion is defined as “specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”56
49. See Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 115-16, 243, 249; Arias
Complaint, supra note 32, ¶¶ 47, 48; Mancha Complaint, supra note 32, ¶ 60.
50. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
52. See Investigation and Police Practices, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3,
3 (2006).
53. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1 (4th ed. 2004).
54. United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
55. See Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 52, at 18-19 (citing Illinois v. R
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000)).
56. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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A. Standards for Home Entry in the Criminal Context
In evaluating the constitutionality of immigration enforcement in
the home, it is instructive to examine criminal law, where the home
has been a target for quite some time.  In the criminal context,
courts recognize that the Fourth Amendment was created to pro-
tect the home, and have therefore afforded private residences spe-
cial protection.57  Indeed, although the Fourth Amendment affords
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in public
places and in businesses, courts have recognized that “[f]reedom
from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the
privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment.”58  The idea
that “every man’s house is his castle” is found in English common
law,59 and was manifested in early American jurisprudence by out-
rage over the writs of assistance.60  Special protection for the home,
however, can be traced back through Roman and even Biblical
law.61  Because of this special protection for the home, criminal law
has strict guidelines for when a home can be entered in the absence
of a judicial search warrant.62
1. Searches Based on Consent.
A search executed without a warrant is normally presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amend-
57. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (“It is axiomatic that the
‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed.’”  (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Plamondon),
407 U.S. 297 , 313 (1972))) .
58. Dorman v. United States 435 F.2d 385, 389 (1970) (citing Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925)).
59. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 47-50 (1937).
60. It is recognized that the Fourth Amendment was written largely in response to
non-judicial warrants called writs of assistance that did not specifically state what was
to be searched or seized, and were issued without oath or probable cause.  Geoffrey
G. Hemphill, The Administrative Search Doctrine:  Isn’t this Exactly What the Framers
Were Trying to Avoid?, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 215, 223-25 (1995).  Although the war-
rants enabled British customs officers to search places of business, as well as homes,
criticism of the writs was focused on their intrusion in the home. See id.; David E.
Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56
FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1068-69 (2004) (“In 1772, Samuel Adams complained that customs
officers may violate ‘the sacred rights of the Domicil’ and ransack houses.  In 1774,
the Continental Congress denounced customs officers, who could ‘break open and
enter houses without the authority of any civil magistrate founded on legal
information.’”).
61. See LASSON, supra note 59, at 13-18. R
62. See generally Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 52. R
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ment.63  Law enforcement personnel can lawfully search a home
without a warrant, however, if a resident of the home or a person
with “common authority over or other sufficient relationship to”
the home gives voluntary consent.64  The burden is on the govern-
ment to prove that consent was voluntary.65  A court determines
the voluntariness of consent through an evaluation of the totality
of the circumstances.66  Among the factors weighed in making this
determination are: knowledge of the right to refuse consent,67 age,
level of intelligence or education, length and character of the
search or detention, coercive behavior by law enforcement,68 and
proficiency in English.69  Consent is not voluntary when an officer
claims to have authority to enter the home but in fact has none.70
Consent may be implied through actions such as giving officers a
key71 or stepping back from the door.72  Consent is not implied,
however, when a person opens a door to determine who is seeking
entry73 or when a person steps aside to avoid being knocked down
by the officer seeking entry into his home.74
2. Searches Pursuant to Exigent Circumstances.
In the absence of consent, law enforcement officers can enter a
home under exigent circumstances.75  Exigent circumstances exist
when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to
secure a warrant.”76  Courts sanction entry pursuant to exigent cir-
cumstances when law enforcement officers fear destruction of evi-
dence,77 are in hot pursuit of a suspect,78 believe the suspect will
63. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
64. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
65. See United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544, 557 (1980).
66. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
67. See id.  Although this factor is taken into account, it is not a necessary element
for voluntary consent. Id. at 232-33.
68. See id. at 226.
69. See United States v. Contreras, 372 F.3d 974, 977-78 (8th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Velasquez, 885
F.2d 1076, 1082 (3d Cir. 1989).
70. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549-50 (1968).
71. See United States v. Rosi, 27 F.3d 409, 412 (9th Cir. 1994).
72. See United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2004).
73. See United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990).
74. United States v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1998).
75. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1967)).
76. Id.
77. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41-42 (1963).
78. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990).  Entry pursuant to “hot pur-
suit” will not usually be justified unless there is some sort of chase involved. See
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escape before a warrant can be obtained,79 or when delay would
“gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”80  A search
pursuant to exigent circumstances is only permitted insofar as is
necessary to accommodate the particular exigency.81  For instance,
once law enforcement has secured the evidence in danger of de-
struction, prevented a suspect’s imminent flight, or there is no
longer a danger, they cannot enter a home without a warrant or
consent.82  Application of the exigent circumstances exception to
entry of the home is especially circumscribed and has explicitly
been reserved for serious crimes.83
3. Entry of a Home to Effectuate an Arrest.
Even armed with a valid arrest warrant, law enforcement officers
may not enter a home to effectuate an arrest unless there is (1) a
reasonable belief that the place to be entered is the suspect’s resi-
dence and (2) a reason to believe that the suspect is present.84  In
determining whether an officer has a reasonable belief of resi-
dence, courts consider whether the information relied upon in
targeting the home is current.85  Courts also look to see whether
officers consulted utility, property, or other records to ensure that
the suspect resides at the home in question.86  In determining
whether officers have a reasonable belief of presence, courts do not
require officers to see a suspect enter the residence in question.87
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 n.3 (1976) (citing Johnson v. United States,
33 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948)).
79. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 100.
80. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
81. Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 52, at 76. R
82. See id.
83. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (“[A]pplication of the exi-
gent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanc-
tioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has been
committed.”).
84. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980).  “Reason to believe” is not
specifically defined in Payton, but the majority of courts require less proof to establish
a “reason to believe” than to establish probable cause.  Matthew A. Edwards, Pos-
ner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV. 299, 362-63 (2002).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339, 343-44 (2d Cir. 1999).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 319 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding entry
to be reasonable where telephone service at the address was in the name of a woman
with defendant’s last name); Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 682-83 (5th Cir. 1980)
(finding home entry to be unreasonable where officers did not attempt to verify the
address listed on the warrant despite their knowledge that out-of-county warrants
were inaccurate in twenty to twenty-five percent of cases).
87. See Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Rather, officers can rely on “common sense factors” such as
parked cars, the time of day, and a suspect’s employment sched-
ule,88 as well as accounts of witnesses informing officers that the
suspect is present.89
4. Consequences of Fourth Amendment Violations
The consequences of Fourth Amendment violations by law en-
forcement officers can be severe.  Evidence that is obtained
through a Fourth Amendment violation can be excluded from use
in a criminal trial.90  A victim of a Fourth Amendment violation
may also have a damages claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.91 Bivens held
that an individual who has been a victim of a Fourth Amendment
violation at the hands of a federal officer can sue that officer for
monetary damages in federal court.92  If the violation was commit-
ted by a State law enforcement officer, a victim can sue for dam-
ages or injunctive relief under title 42, section 1983 of the U.S
Code.  Section 1983 provides that any person who commits a con-
stitutional violation “under color of” a state “statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage,” is subject to an action at law or suit
in equity.93
B. Barriers to Application of the Traditional Fourth
Amendment Scheme to Immigration Enforcement in the Home
1. Differences Between Criminal and Immigration Enforcement
for Fourth Amendment Purposes
Viewed through the lens of criminal law’s intricate system of
protection for the home,  ICE’s behavior in carrying out “Opera-
tion Return to Sender” and “Operation Community Shield” raises
serious Fourth Amendment concerns.  ICE enters homes without
search warrants and many of the factors that weigh against a deter-
mination of valid consent are present during pre-entry exchanges
88. See id.
89. See United States v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 222 (2d Cir. 1982).
90. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (finding evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment should be excluded in state court); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960) (finding evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment should be excluded in federal court); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
91. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
92. See id. at 396-97.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008).
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between ICE agents and residents.94  Furthermore, even when ICE
seeks entry pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, evidence of targeting
homes based on incorrect or outdated information raises doubts
about whether ICE agents possess a “reasonable belief” that the
subject of a warrant resides at the home in question or is present at
the time of entry.95  However, a number of factors differentiate the
criminal and immigration enforcement schemes for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.  Although these distinctions do not remove the
Fourth Amendment’s protection in the immigration context, they
preclude direct application of criminal standards.
One consideration unique to the immigration context is the Ple-
nary Power Doctrine.  According to the Plenary Power Doctrine,
immigration policy is an aspect of external sovereignty that, like
the power to declare war or make treaties, is entrusted solely to the
political branches of government.96  Accordingly, courts should
give these branches wide latitude in regulating the admission and
removal of immigrants.97  This means that immigration policy is not
held to the same constitutional standards as domestic law and in-
deed at times escapes constitutional review entirely.98  For in-
stance, courts have cited the Plenary Power doctrine to support
findings that immigration legislation favoring particular nationali-
ties does not violate the equal protection clause,99 and that an im-
migrant denied a visa based on his political viewpoint cannot
invoke the First Amendment.100  This constitutional leniency, how-
94. See supra notes 10-13, 40-47 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 14-24, 30-38 and accompanying text.
96. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).  The most widely ac-
cepted rationale for the Plenary Power Doctrine is that because immigration policy
concerns citizens of other nations, it necessarily implicates foreign affairs. See Ste-
phen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 261 (1984).  For example, nations may intervene on
behalf of their citizens in other countries and immigration policy considerations have
the power to affect international negotiations. See id. at 262.
97. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)
(“Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely im-
mune from judicial control.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889); Barbara Hines, An Overview of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy Since 9/11,
12 TEX. HISP J.L. &  POL’Y 9, 14 (2006).
98. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 766 (1972); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543
(1950).
99. See, e.g., Romero v. INS, 399 F.3d 109, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that
because of the plenary power of Congress over immigration law, such legislation will
be upheld if there is a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the law”).
100. See Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 768-69.
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ever, applies only to admission and removal policies and does not
apply to efforts to regulate the rights and obligations of immigrants
generally.101  For example, the Plenary Power does not apply to
legislation regarding tax or social welfare policy for immigrants.102
Additionally, although the Plenary Power doctrine may limit con-
stitutional scrutiny of immigration policy, ICE agents acting
outside of that policy are not insulated from responsibility for con-
stitutional violations.103  Thus, to the extent that ICE policy autho-
rizes Fourth Amendment violations that are unrelated to admission
or exclusion, or that ICE agents commit Fourth Amendment viola-
tions that are not authorized by ICE policies, the Plenary Power
doctrine does not shield this behavior from Fourth Amendment
scrutiny.
Another factor that distinguishes immigration law from criminal
law is that an immigration proceeding is civil, rather than criminal,
in nature.  Therefore, an immigrant facing removal does not enjoy
the same constitutional protections as a criminal defendant.104  The
justification for this different level of protection is that civil viola-
tions carry less severe penalties than criminal violations, and there-
fore the additional safeguards afforded in criminal law are
unnecessary.105  For instance, an immigration hearing can proceed
even if the subject of the hearing is absent,106 and ICE need not
prove that an immigrant is deportable beyond a reasonable doubt,
but rather by clear and convincing evidence.107  With regard to the
101. See Legomsky, supra note 96, at 256 (making this distinction and noting that R
immigrants have property rights and equal protection rights).
102. See id.
103. See Helfand, supra note 45, at 117. R
104. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
105. See Judy C. Wong, Egregious Fourth Amendment Violations and the Use of the
Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Hearings:  The Need for Substantive Equal Protec-
tion Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 431, 442-43
(1997).  This argument has been strongly criticized by many commentators, who argue
that the catastrophic consequences of deportation for immigrants, as well as the in-
creasing use of deportation as punishment for criminal violations, requires that crimi-
nal protections be applied in the immigration context. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom,
Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment:  Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws
Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1935 (2000); Robert Pauw, A New Look at
Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s Criminal Proce-
dure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 339-40 (2000).
106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2007); Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038-39.
107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2007); Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038-39.
However, if a person is seeking admission into the country, they must prove that they
are ‘‘clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and [are] not inadmissible
under section 212 [of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)].’’  8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(2)(A).
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Fourth Amendment in particular, the Supreme Court held that
with the possible exception of “egregious violations,”108 the exclu-
sionary rule does not apply in immigration proceedings.109  How-
ever, the civil nature of immigration law does not preclude
application of the Fourth Amendment.  The language of the Fourth
Amendment does not limit itself to application in criminal law,110
and courts recognize that even in civil contexts, such as housing or
health inspections, people have the right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures.111
Although Fourth Amendment rights apply in the civil context,
courts do not automatically import criminal standards.  Rather, in
civil cases a court evaluates the “reasonableness” of law enforce-
ment action by balancing the legitimate law enforcement interest
with the level of intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
privacy interest.112  This balancing test is also used to determine the
appropriate level of cause necessary to justify the issuance of a
warrant in civil settings.  Depending on the weight of the compet-
ing interests, a court will require different evidentiary standards for
intrusion.113
In order to apply this balancing test to the immigration enforce-
ment context, the individuals affected by immigration enforcement
operations must possess a Fourth Amendment privacy interest.
The Fourth Amendment’s protection of immigrants in the immi-
gration enforcement context is not well established.  At least one
federal judge has argued that the Fourth Amendment does not ex-
108. Such “egregious violations” have been pled with varying degrees of success.
Compare Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating
that “lack of any valid basis whatsoever for a seizure” does not constitute an “egre-
gious” Fourth Amendment violation), with Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441,
1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (seizure based solely on race is an “egregious” Fourth Amend-
ment violation).
109. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 (1984).  The Supreme Court also in-
dicated that it might decide the issue differently in the face of evidence of widespread
Fourth Amendment violations by immigration agents. Id.
110. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
111. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Mun.
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
112. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (citing Marshall, 436 U.S.
at  312).  Courts also engage in this balancing test in the criminal setting—usually
when confronting an atypical situation that is less intrusive than a typical search or
seizure. LAFAVE, supra note 53, § 3.2.  Numerous judges and commentators have
argued that to balance such different and intangible interests is not only futile, but
also means that judges will merely make the decision based on their own preferences.
See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Hemphill, supra note 60, at 243-44. R
113. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55.
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tend to illegal immigrants who have criminal histories,114 and the
Supreme Court has suggested that admission of immigrants is con-
ditioned upon the government’s right to subject them to “reasona-
ble questioning about their right to be and remain in the
country.”115
Despite this uncertainty, Fourth Amendment interests can be
clearly defined in the immigration context.  First, the language of
the Fourth Amendment extends to non-citizens,116 and courts have
repeatedly recognized this, weighing the Fourth Amendment inter-
ests of non-citizens in evaluating the constitutionality of immigra-
tion enforcement action.117  Although the Fourth Amendment
rights of illegal immigrants are not well defined,118 courts recognize
that because immigration enforcement affects citizens, legal immi-
grants, and illegal immigrants,119 ICE’s actions cannot be evaluated
under the assumption that only illegal immigrants will be af-
fected.120  Rather, courts consider the privacy interests of legal im-
migrants and citizens when evaluating the constitutionality of
immigration enforcement, regardless of the immigration status of
the person or persons that are the target of the operation.121
Therefore, the privacy interest that must be weighed in determin-
ing the proper standard for ICE enforcement in the home is the
well established Fourth Amendment privacy interest of citizens and
legal immigrants, who will inevitably be affected by immigration
enforcement activities.122
2. Home Raids as Searches and Seizures?
Not only does the Fourth Amendment apply to the immigration
enforcement context in general, but it applies specifically to ICE
behavior in executing initiatives such as “Operation Return to
114. United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003),
aff’d on other grounds, 386 F.3d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 2004).
115. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-84 (1975).
116. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117. See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 213 n.1, 218 (1984); Zepeda v. INS, 753
F.2d 719, 722, 727 (9th Cir. 1983); Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011,
1022-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
118. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
120. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that the Fourth Amendment
rights of citizens and legal immigrants must be considered in evaluating immigration
enforcement activity. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882; Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 n.5 (1973).
121. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882; Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273 n.5.
122. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882; Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273 n.5.
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Sender” and “Operation Community Shield”  because such behav-
ior results in “searches” or “seizures” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
a. Searches
A search occurs whenever the government invades a place where
a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”123  Such a de-
termination depends on (1) whether the individual establishes a
subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and (2)
whether society recognizes that expectation as reasonable.124  This
standard was developed in criminal law but is cited in the ICE
manual on arrest, search, and seizure and is applied in the civil
context.125  The subjective expectation of privacy held by ICE’s
targets in their homes is evidenced by the shock and trauma they
experience when ICE agents enter their homes.126  With regard to
society’s expectations, courts consistently find entry into homes, by
either criminal or civil law enforcement agents, to constitute a
search.127  Indeed, defining government entry into the home as a
search is so commonplace that it is not frequently discussed in judi-
cial opinions.128  This presumption applies no differently in the im-
migration context where lower federal courts have found physical
entry into homes by law enforcement to be a search without even
mentioning the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test.129  There-
fore, ICE’s entry into a home pursuant to initiatives such as “Oper-
123. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
124. Id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
125. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INS MANUAL, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND
SEIZURE FOR IMMIGRATION OFFICERS ch. 3, introductory cmt. (2008); see also Michi-
gan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-06 (1978); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 314-17
(1921).
126. See, e.g., Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 187, 206; Arias
Complaint, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 89-90; Mancha Complaint, supra note 32, at ¶¶ 27, 35,
66; Robert L. Smith, Families Process Trauma of Raids, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
May 23, 2007, at A1.
127. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a “Search” Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006).  In the criminal context, the Supreme
Court has found that because protection of the home is so rooted in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, failure to recognize an expectation of privacy in the home would
be to “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
128. See Clancy, supra note 127, at 7. R
129. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F.2d 834, 839 (2d Cir. 1976).
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ation Return to Sender” or “Operation Community Shield”
constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.130
b. Seizures
ICE action results in seizures as well as searches.  In the immi-
gration context, the Supreme Court held that a seizure occurs
when, “in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.”131  The news stories and accounts in recently filed com-
plaints demonstrate that in many instances people do not feel free
to leave during an ICE home raid.132  This is especially true when
officers display guns,133 engage in intimidating behavior,134 and
force all residents into one room for systematic questioning.135  Fi-
nally, because these raids often take place in the home and often in
the middle of the night, residents cannot leave without jeopardiz-
ing their safety or at least raising real suspicion that they are en-
gaged in illegal activity.136
C. Specific Standards in the Immigration Enforcement Context
1. Home Raid Cases
Although the Fourth Amendment applies to the home raid con-
text, and the ICE manual offers some standards as described
above, case law offers very limited guidance about what behavior is
constitutionally permissible in homes.
130. For a discussion of circumstances under which such searches are permissible
without a warrant see notes 62-88, 184-90, and accompanying text.
131. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). Mendenhall elaborates that:
[C]ircumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not
attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of
the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer’s request might be compelled.
446 U.S. at 554.
132. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
133. Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶ 104, 154; Mancha Complaint,
supra note 32, ¶ 27; see Dyson, supra note 40. R
134. Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 107, 205, 209, 255; Mancha
Complaint, supra note 32, ¶ 58; see Freedman, supra note 39. R
135. Aguilar Amended Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 120, 193; Arias Complaint,
supra, note 32, ¶ 82.
136. These final two factors distinguish the home raid context from INS v. Delgado,
where the Supreme Court found that no seizure had taken place during an INS work-
place raid.  In Delgado, factory workers were allowed to continue the tasks associated
with their employment while INS agents walked around questioning individuals.  466
U.S. at 218.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ501.txt unknown Seq: 20 29-OCT-08 10:11
1018 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
Much of the existing guidance comes from federal district
courts.137  With regard to initial targeting of a home, the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that ICE agents may approach homes at any hour of the
day without reasonable suspicion that illegal immigrants are pre-
sent.138  ICE may not, however, search a home without a warrant
unless exigent circumstances exist.139  Moreover, one federal court
determined that the warrant necessary to search a home may not
be the sort of administrative search warrant that is issued on less
than traditional probable cause (the standard that is permissible for
an ICE search of a business).140  Rather, because home raids are
more intrusive than other types of administrative searches, a war-
rant to search a home must be issued upon a “showing of probable
cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is located in a
particular place.”141  Finally, with regard to the scope of permissi-
ble action once inside a home, the Second Circuit found that entry
pursuant to a valid immigration arrest does not justify the search of
an entire residence.142  If, however, law enforcement is already de-
taining a person in the home for a criminal purpose, the Supreme
Court held that ICE agents can question that person about their
immigration status without a reasonable suspicion of alienage.143
137. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 731 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pacheco-
Ruiz, 549 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F.2d 834,
838-39 (2d Cir. 1976); Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1022 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
138. See Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 731.  The court held that to restrict INS officers in
approaching homes would inhibit the INS from carrying out routine investigations.
Id.  In addition, the court struck down the portion of an injunction that prevented the
INS from approaching homes between 8:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances or probable cause, finding that that the Fourth Amendment does
not “appl[y] differently at different times of the day.” Id.
139. See Pacheco-Ruiz, 549 F.2d at 1207 (finding no exigent circumstances to justify
INS agent’s entry where “[a] magistrate was presumably within reasonable distance
and [t]here were enough officers present to make certain that until a warrant was
issued no one could leave the premises without being checked for citizenship”); see
also Rodriguez, 532 F.2d at 839; Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. at 1022.
140. See Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. at 1022.
141. Id. (quoting Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981)).  In balancing
the level of intrusion with immigration enforcement necessity the court also consid-
ered that administrative warrants have not been historically accepted, immigration
presents no threat to public heath or safety, and that immigration laws can be en-
forced through other means. See id.
142. See Rodriguez, 532 F.2d at 839.
143. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (finding that a “shift in purpose”
does not need additional justification to be permissible for Fourth Amendment
purposes).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ501.txt unknown Seq: 21 29-OCT-08 10:11
2008] PRIVACY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1019
2. Workplace Enforcement Cases
In other contexts, however, the application of the Fourth
Amendment to immigration law is better established.  With regard
to workplace enforcement, courts have sanctioned warrants issued
on less than the probable cause which is necessary in criminal
law.144  Such warrants were first sanctioned in Camara v. Municipal
Court,145 where the Supreme Court found that although a munici-
pal health inspection could not be conducted in a home without a
search warrant, a warrant for a health inspection could be issued
on a lower standard of probable cause.146  Because the standard for
probable cause can “take into account the nature of the search that
is being sought,” the court found that “‘probable cause’ to issue a
warrant to inspect . . . exist[s] if reasonable legislative or adminis-
trative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied
with respect to a particular dwelling.”147
In Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, the D.C. Circuit ap-
plied this framework to the immigration enforcement context and
held that the INS could not enter a business without a warrant or
exigent circumstances.148  Based on the nature of an INS workplace
search, the court found that “flexible” probable cause in the work-
place enforcement context required that a warrant contain “suffi-
cient specificity and reliability to prevent the exercise of unbridled
144. See Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1223 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
145. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
146. See id. at 538.
147. Id.  Although not universally applied in administrative search and seizure
cases, this “flexible” concept of probable cause is unique to the context of administra-
tive warrants. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 878 n.4 (1987); see also Barry
Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1396-97
(1994).  It does not apply to “probable cause” as the term describes the quantum of
suspicion necessary to search or seize without a warrant, nor does it apply to the
issuance of a criminal search warrant. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878 n.4.  Although
criminal law enforcement also balances government and individual interests when de-
termining the level of suspicion necessary for a search or seizure without a warrant, a
lower level of cause in the criminal context is characterized as “reasonable suspicion,”
rather than a lower level of probable cause. See id.  Indeed, the Supreme Court re-
jected a balancing test for probable cause in the criminal context because police of-
ficers, who have “limited time and expertise” need a “single, familiar standard.”
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979).  Throughout this Note, this lower
standard of probable cause for the issuance of administrative warrants will be referred
to as “flexible probable cause” in order to avoid confusion with the traditional
standard.
148. See Blackie’s, 659 F.2d at 1223.  Note, however, that the INS may enter if given
consent to do so.
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discretion by law enforcement.”149  In Blackie’s, this standard was
satisfied by a warrant that stated: the location to be searched, the
time of the search, restricted the search to only those areas “where
aliens were likely to be hiding,” and contained general descriptions
of the persons sought.150  The warrant was also supported by sur-
veillance of the business establishment and an affidavit from an
anonymous employee of Blackie’s.151
In the event that ICE agents attempt to search a business based
on consent rather than a warrant, consent must not be based on
“duress or coercion, express or implied.”152  Whether ICE agents
obtained valid consent will be “determined from the totality of all
the circumstances.”153  For example, courts have found voluntary
consent to search a business when immigration agents did not
make threats, show force, or reveal their weapons,154 and found
consent to be involuntary when agents acted in a way that “would
leave a reasonable person with the belief that he had no choice but
to consent to the raid.”155
Once ICE agents are lawfully inside a business, agents may ques-
tion employees without seizing them for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses unless “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not
free to leave.”156  Under this standard, courts have found that phys-
ical restraint and instructions not to move or leave constitute
seizures.157  On the other hand, systematic questioning of factory
employees, even when INS blocks workplace exits, does not consti-
tute a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.158  If a seizure oc-
curs, it must be based on “reasonable suspicion that the particular
worker is an illegal alien” in order to be permissible under the
Fourth Amendment.159  As noted above, the “reasonable suspi-
cion” standard is lower than the traditional probable cause stan-
149. See id. at 1225 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
150. See id.; Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799
F.2d 547, 553 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying the Blackie’s standard).
151. See Blackie’s, 659 F.2d at 1227.
152. Jenkins v. INS, 108 F.3d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1997).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Int’l Molders’, 799 F.2d at 554.
156. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (quoting United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
157. See Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm v. Nelson, 723 F. Supp. 432, 446 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
158. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216, 218.
159. See Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 1987).
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dard,160 and is defined as “specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasona-
bly warrant [the] intrusion.”161  For example, such suspicion may be
supported by an employee’s failure to produce a green card,162 but
Hispanic appearance alone cannot support a reasonable
suspicion.163
3. Vehicle Cases
An additional source of insight into the application of the Fourth
Amendment to immigration enforcement can be found in law re-
garding stopping and searching vehicles.  Except at the border or
its “functional equivalent,”164 ICE may not stop a vehicle without
reasonable suspicion that it “contain[s] aliens who are illegally in
the country.”165  In forming such a reasonable suspicion, an officer
can consider the make of the car, driving patterns, whether the car
appears heavily laden, the area in which the car is located, physical
characteristics typical of Mexican citizens, and other factors rele-
vant in light of the officers’ experience.166
Once a vehicle is stopped, it may not be searched without a war-
rant, consent or probable cause.167  Although the Immigration and
Nationality Act provides that ICE agents have the power to con-
duct warrantless searches of vehicles within a “reasonable dis-
tance” from the border,168 courts have explicitly stated that this
160. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
161. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
162. Martinez, 831 F.2d at 828.
163. See Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm v. Nelson, 723 F. Supp. 432, 447 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
164. An example of a functional equivalent of the border would be an airport
where an international flight has landed, or an intersection where a road coming from
the border meets another. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-
73 (1973).
165. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).  In Brignoni-Ponce,
the Supreme Court found that a roving border patrol could not, consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, stop a car based solely on the presence of people of apparent
Mexican descent within the car. Id. at 885-86.  Note that apparent Mexican descent
can be considered as one of many factors justifying a stop. Id. at 886-87.
166. See id. at 884-85.
167. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 274-75.  The Almeida court disagreed as to
whether a warrant for the vehicle search could be issued on a flexible probable cause
standard. Id. at 270 n.3.  In his concurrence, Justice Powell advocated a Camara-type
warrant that would be issued based on the “[predictable] incidence of illegal transpor-
tation of aliens on certain roads” and a “predetermined schedule” of enforcement
operations. Id. at 283 (Powell, J., concurring).  There is no mention of a lesser stan-
dard of probable cause in the absence of a warrant.
168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2008).  A reasonable distance is defined as 100
miles. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2008).
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does not give ICE free reign to conduct searches within this ra-
dius.169  Rather, a warrant, consent, or probable cause is required
unless a search takes place at the border or its “functional
equivalent.”170
III. APPLICATION OF EXISTING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
STANDARDS TO THE HOME: EVALUATION OF CURRENT
PRACTICES AND A CALL FOR REFORM
A. Extension of Workplace and Vehicle Enforcement Standards
to the Home
Although Fourth Amendment standards from vehicle and work-
place enforcement do not account for the special protection af-
forded to the home in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, they can
provide guidance in determining appropriate standards for initia-
tives such as “Operation Return to Sender” and “Operation Com-
munity Shield.”  As explained above, Fourth Amendment
standards in civil cases are determined by balancing the law en-
forcement interest at stake with the extent of Fourth Amendment
intrusion on individuals.171  Therefore, a comparison of the law en-
forcement and individual interests at stake in home raids with
those at stake in other immigration enforcement contexts will help
determine whether standards developed for vehicles and work-
places are appropriately applied to the home.
In the home context, the law enforcement interests are signifi-
cant.  According to the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, the
unauthorized immigrant population of the United States rose from
8.5 million in 2000 to 11.6 million in 2006.172  Faced with frustration
expressed by citizens around the country over Congress’ failure to
create workable immigration policy, the federal government faces
enormous pressures to combat illegal immigration.173  Because
169. See United States v. Lonabaugh, 494 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272).
170. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272, 275.
171. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
172. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRA-
TION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statis-
tics/publications/ill_pe_2006.pdf.
173. See, e.g., RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMMIGRATION RE-
FORM: BRIEF SYNTHESIS OF ISSUE (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/91856.pdf (“There is a broad-based consensus that the U.S. immigration
system is broken.”); Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 2007, at 30
(quoting Arizona governor Janet Napolitano’s statement to Congress that “[o]ne of
the practical effects of [Congress’s] failure to effectively address immigration reform
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large numbers of immigrants tend to live together in concentrated
communities,174 and even in single-family homes,175 initiatives that
target illegal immigrants in their homes have the potential to vastly
increase the numbers of immigration arrests.  Although significant,
this government interest is no greater in the home than in other
areas of immigration enforcement where ICE faces the same diffi-
culties.  Indeed one federal court found that law enforcement inter-
ests are diminished in the home raid context precisely because
there are other less intrusive ways to enforce immigration law.176
On the other hand, the privacy interests at stake in the home
raid context are much greater than in the vehicle or workplace con-
text because of the special protection afforded to the home by the
Fourth Amendment.177  When a person drives onto the open road
or reports to work, they may no longer have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy178 and may be subjected to a number of intrusive
measures as part of everyday life such as traffic stops179 or work-
place drug tests.180  The Supreme Court has repeatedly distin-
guished the expectation of privacy in these settings from the
expectation of privacy in the home.181  Thus, because courts recog-
nize invasion of homes as the greatest Fourth Amendment intru-
‘is that Arizona, and states across the nation, must now continue to address this esca-
lating problem on their own.’’’).
174. See Ford Fessenden, The New Crossroads of the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2006 at 14NJ.
175. See id.
176. See Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1022-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
177. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. R
178. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (noting that employees’ “ex-
pectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets . . . may be reduced by
virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation”); New
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986) (indicating that there is a lower expectation
of privacy in automobiles because, inter alia, “‘[a] car has little capacity for escaping
public scrutiny’ . . . [and is] subject [to] pervasive regulation by the State” (quoting
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion))).
179. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004).
180. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
181. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).  Notably, Jus-
tice Powell’s Almeida concurrence, which advocates a lesser probable cause standard
for the vehicle searches, specifically mentions that Fourth Amendment concerns are
less pronounced in the vehicle context than in the home. Id. at 279; see also Lidster,
540 U.S. at 424 (“The Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist’s car as his cas-
tle.”); O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-18 (“An office is seldom a private enclave free from
entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees . . . the
question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be ad-
dressed on a case-by-case basis.”); Class, 475 U.S. at 112-13 (“One has a lesser expec-
tation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects.”).
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sion—and the law enforcement interests involved in home raids
are no greater than those in other methods of immigration enforce-
ment—the level of Fourth Amendment protection for home raids
should be at least as great as that afforded in either the workplace
or vehicle stop context.  As noted earlier, at least one federal court
has required greater protection for immigration raids in the home
than in vehicle and workplace settings.182
B. Minimal Protections Required for Home Raids
1. Current Home Enforcement Behavior Tested Against
Workplace and Vehicle Standards
If the officers charged with carrying out immigration enforce-
ment in the home were required to respect the Fourth Amendment
guidelines that are in place in the vehicle and workplace enforce-
ment contexts, initiatives such as “Operation Return to Sender”
and “Operation Community Shield” would look very different.
For instance, if the reasonable suspicion requirement from the ve-
hicle stop context were applied to home raids, ICE would not be
able to target a home without specific and articulable facts which,
along with inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intru-
sion into the home to seek out illegal immigrants.183  Additionally,
application of the voluntary consent standards from the workplace
search context would mean that ICE would not be able to enter or
search a home unless agents procured consent without implied or
express coercion or duress.184  Further, if the standard for vehicle
searches were applied to home raids, officers would not be able to
search a home without valid consent, a warrant or probable cause
to believe that illegal immigrants were on the premises.185  Even if
the lower standard of probable cause from the workplace search
warrant context were applied to home searches, ICE could not pro-
ceed without a judicial warrant containing “sufficient specificity
and reliability to prevent the exercise of unbridled discretion by
law enforcement,” and supported by evidence that illegal immi-
grants are present within the home.186
182. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
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2. Lessons from ICE’s Own Internal Guidelines
ICE’s own manual for arrest, search, and seizure supports appli-
cation of these minimal protections to the home raid context.  Al-
though the manual does not contain explicit guidelines for
targeting homes, it provides that a home may not be searched with-
out a warrant or probable cause.187  Exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement track criminal law and include consent, search incident
to a valid arrest, and exigent circumstances.188  The manual con-
tains detailed guidelines about what constitutes valid consent.189  It
explains that, among other factors, an officer should take into ac-
count a resident’s level of education or intelligence, as well as
whether a person knows he can refuse consent.190  The manual also
makes clear that valid consent cannot be obtained through coer-
cion, threats, or tricks, and explains that “mere failure to object to
a search or otherwise resist is not consent.”191  With regard to a
search incident to a valid arrest, such a search can only include the
area within the immediate control of the suspect.192  Finally, the
manual authorizes searches pursuant to exigent circumstances if
the officers have probable cause to search, and “some exigency or
compelling urgency requires immediate action in order to protect
law enforcement personnel or the public, or to prevent the destruc-
tion of contraband evidence.”193  In determining whether exigent
circumstances exist, the manual notes that courts will consider:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the crime; (2) whether the
suspect is believed to be armed; (3) a clear showing of probable
cause to believe that the suspect committed the offense; (4) like-
lihood that the suspect will escape absent swift action; (5) level
of force utilized in effecting the entry; (6) reason to believe that
the suspect is on the premises; and (7) insufficient time to obtain
even a telephonic warrant.194
187. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 125, at ch. 3, pt. A(1). R
188. Id. at pts. B(1)-(3).
189. See id. at pt. B(2).
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at pt. B(1).
193. Id. at pt. B(3) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)).
194. Id. (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984); United States v.
Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gomez, 652 F. Supp. 715,
718 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
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3. Is ICE Complying with These Minimum Requirements?
Current practices for immigration enforcement in the home do
not comply with the guidelines set forth in the ICE manual or the
minimal protections in place in the vehicle or workplace enforce-
ment contexts.  As evidenced by complaints of targeting based on
childhood photos,195 repeated mistaken entries of the same
home,196 and ICE refusal to consult police records in determining
which homes to target,197 ICE engages in a practice of targeting
homes without meeting the lower standard of “reasonable suspi-
cion” required even to stop a vehicle.198  Once ICE targets a home,
agents use threats, intimidation, and sometimes even force to ob-
tain entry.199  This practice violates voluntary consent standards ap-
plied in workplace immigration enforcement and cited in ICE’s
own internal guidelines.200  After gaining entry, ICE agents often
proceed to search the entire home for illegal immigrants,201 a prac-
tice that is prohibited by case law in the vehicle and workplace
enforcement contexts,202 as well as ICE’s manual for arrest, search,
and seizure.203
These searches do not fall under any of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement recognized in criminal law and outlined in
ICE’s internal guidelines.  Because exchanges between ICE agents
and residents do not even reveal consent to enter,204 there is no
evidence of valid consent to search.  With regard to searches inci-
dent to a valid arrest, an examination of ICE practices and collat-
eral arrest statistics reveals that ICE routinely searches each room
of a home in order to arrest as many illegal immigrants as possible,
even if only one person is named on the administrative warrant.205
Such behavior exceeds the scope of a search incident to a valid
arrest by going beyond the area within the immediate control of
the suspect.206  Finally, it is doubtful that exigent circumstances ex-
ist frequently in the home raid context given that immigration vio-
195. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. R
200. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. R
202. See supra notes 146, 165-68 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 39-45  and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. R
206. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ501.txt unknown Seq: 29 29-OCT-08 10:11
2008] PRIVACY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1027
lations are civil, non-violent crimes, and residents are unlikely to
flee their homes before ICE agents can obtain a warrant.207
C. Home Enforcement Reform Through Existing Standards:
Specific Proposals
By following Fourth Amendment standards from other immigra-
tion enforcement contexts in carrying out initiatives such as “Oper-
ation Return to Sender” and “Operation Community Shield,” as
well as complying with its own internal guidelines, ICE could sig-
nificantly curb practices that implicate Fourth Amendment rights.
Certain measures, such as enforcing existing consent guidelines and
creating guidelines for initial targeting of homes, are potentially
beneficial but would be difficult to enforce.  The most effective way
to reform ICE’s home enforcement program through the existing
immigration scheme is to require court-ordered warrants for ICE’s
home raids.
One possible method of reforming ICE’s home enforcement
program is to enforce the existing guidelines for obtaining valid
consent for entry and search of a home.  These guidelines have
been in place throughout the course of “Operation Return to
Sender” and “Operation Community Shield” and, at least accord-
ing to anecdotal evidence, have not been followed.208  Increased
enforcement of these guidelines, however, is unlikely to be success-
ful because there is no reliable way to monitor compliance.  As-
suming that the offending officers cannot be relied upon to report
to their own non-consensual entries, the only way to know about
violations of the consent guidelines is for witnesses or victims of
non-consensual entries to report these violations to law enforce-
ment or the courts.  This is unlikely to happen in the immigration
enforcement context because many victims of home raids do not
know their Fourth Amendment rights or may be reluctant to seek
legal redress for fear of legal retribution.209  Additionally, because
of the limited application of the exclusionary rule in immigration
proceedings,210 victims of raids have little motivation to speak out
about non-consensual entry.  Furthermore, even if a witness to or
subject of a home raid complains about an ICE officer entering a
207. See generally supra note 194 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 40-45, 197-98 and accompanying text. R
209. See Helfand, supra note 45, at 107 (explaining that because of language barri- R
ers and fears of retaliation on themselves or illegal family members, even documented
immigrants are unlikely to bring legal action); Schulz, supra note 45, at 153-54. R
210. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ501.txt unknown Seq: 30 29-OCT-08 10:11
1028 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
home without valid consent, their account of the incident is un-
likely to be credited.  In these situations, the judge or supervising
officer frequently must evaluate evidence consisting only of the
ICE agent’s account and the complaining party’s account.  This in-
quiry often results in favorable rulings for law enforcement.211
Another method of using existing guidelines to address Fourth
Amendment concerns in the home enforcement context would be
to set standards for initial targeting of the home.  For example,
DHS could create guidelines for entry pursuant to an administra-
tive arrest warrant, analogous to those in the criminal context,
which require that officers must have a reasonable belief that the
suspect resides at the home in question and is present at the time of
entry.212  The Ninth Circuit has refused to implement a similar re-
quirement because it inhibits immigration officers in the course of
their investigations.213  However, as outlined above, the Fourth
Amendment intrusion at stake in the immigration enforcement
context is significant.214  Moreover, requiring a reasonable belief of
the presence of illegal immigrants in the home is not a substantial
deviation from the existing Fourth Amendment limitations on im-
migration enforcement.  ICE agents cannot stop a vehicle absent a
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains illegal immigrants,
and ICE agents cannot even briefly detain a person in a workplace
unless they have a reasonable suspicion that the person is an illegal
immigrant.215  It is difficult to support an assertion that ICE should
be permitted to target a house on a lower degree of suspicion than
is necessary to stop a vehicle or briefly detain a person.216  Because
211. Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable:  A New Paradigm for Un-
derstanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 818 (2005) (explaining
that “courts have found consent to be voluntary even if the circumstances show a
significant (if not overwhelming) amount of compulsion”); Marcy Strauss, Recon-
structing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212 (2002) (“Only if the police
behave with some extreme degree of coercion beyond that inherent in the police-
citizen confrontation will a court vitiate the consent.”).
212. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
213. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 722, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing a pre-
liminary injunction that required INS agents to have a reasonable suspicion that ille-
gal immigrants were present before they approached a home).
214. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
216. Reasonable belief is not expressly equated with reasonable suspicion, and at
least one court has specifically distinguished the two standards.  Edwards, supra note
84, at 366-67 (citing Alabama v. White, 456 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).  Both standards, R
however, require less proof than probable cause, but require objective evidence to
justify the search or seizure. See id. at 366-68. Compare supra notes 84-88 and accom-
panying text (listing factors that may be taken into account in forming a reasonable
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ICE frequently targets homes based on inaccurate, outdated infor-
mation, or based on no information at all, a requirement of reason-
able suspicion or belief would curb the number of homes that are
mistakenly entered to execute arrest warrants for immigration
violations.
Although guidelines for when a home may be targeted would
curb the number of mistaken home entries by ICE agents, guide-
lines regulating the initial approach of a home present many of the
same enforcement problems as consent guidelines.  Compliance is
difficult to monitor because there is rarely hard evidence of
whether the ICE agent possessed a “reasonable belief” of resi-
dence or presence.  Therefore, ICE cannot easily conduct internal
investigations to determine compliance, but must rely on either im-
migrant communities or ICE agents themselves speak out about
Fourth Amendment violations.  Moreover, as discussed above, ini-
tiatives such as “Operation Return to Sender” and “Operation
Community Shield” do not contemplate entry simply to arrest the
specific person named on the administrative warrant.  Rather, ICE
enters homes seeking to apprehend as many illegal immigrants as
possible, and thus searches homes within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion in place should reflect the nature of ICE’s activity and require
more safeguards than are necessary for simple entry to make an
administrative arrest.
Instead of guidelines then, because ICE engages in searches
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a court-ordered
search warrant should be required for home raids.217  A judicial
search warrant is required for searches of vehicles and workplaces
which enjoy much less Fourth Amendment protection than the
home.  Requiring judicial search warrants for home raids would re-
sult in a substantial decrease in random and mistaken home en-
tries.  If ICE agents were required to obtain approval from a
neutral decisionmaker before entering a home, instances of entry
belief), with supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text (listing factors that may be
taken into account in forming a reasonable suspicion).
217. Whether this search warrant should be issued pursuant to the traditional prob-
able cause standard or the flexible probable cause standard is beyond the scope of this
Note.  However, because the appropriate probable cause standard is determined by
weighing the law enforcement interests with the level of Fourth Amendment intru-
sion, the probable cause standard necessary for home searches would most likely be
greater than in the workplace context, because the Fourth Amendment interests are
more significant, while the law enforcement interests are no greater. See supra notes
170-80 and accompanying text.
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and search based on outdated information or no information at all
would be significantly curbed.
Further, judicial search warrants would be an enforceable check
on immigration enforcement misconduct because, unlike consent
or reasonable belief guidelines, there is documentary evidence of
whether or not an officer procured a warrant.  Therefore, ICE need
not rely on victims of violations to bring non-compliance to light,
but rather can conduct its own internal investigations.  Further, a
determination of compliance would not require an assessment of
competing recollections regarding the coercive or reasonable na-
ture of an agent’s conduct, but could rest on whether the agent
submitted sufficient evidence to convince a neutral decisionmaker
to issue a warrant.
In response to such a policy proposal, ICE might protest that
obtaining search warrants before home raids would waste time and
resources and thereby hinder the removal of illegal immigrants.218
However, such a policy would not require any greater time or re-
sources than are currently expended in obtaining search warrants
for workplaces, a procedure that immigration enforcement has fol-
lowed for quite some time.219  Indeed, one federal court specifically
found that such a process is not unduly burdensome.220
ICE might also claim that because initiatives such as “Operation
Return to Sender” and “Operation Community Shield” are en-
tirely based on the consent of residents, no search warrant is neces-
sary.221  A related argument would be that no search warrant is
necessary because ICE enters homes only to execute arrest war-
rants.222  These arguments fail because safeguards in place to pre-
vent law enforcement misconduct should reflect the nature of the
operation as it is actually carried out.  There is no doubt that in the
home enforcement context, as in other immigration enforcement
schemes and criminal law, no search warrant is required when an
officer obtains valid consent or satisfies requirements for entry pur-
218. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (“[T]he
government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest
when, as here, ‘the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmen-
tal purpose behind the search.’”  (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533
(1967))).
219. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
220. Ill. Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 531 F. Supp. 1011, 1023 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“We
hardly think INS will be crippled if it is not permitted to conduct those searches which
a magistrate believes are not warranted . . . .”).
221. See Aguilar Memorandum of Law, supra note 10, at 12. R
222. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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suant to an arrest.223  Other immigration enforcement schemes and
criminal law, however, have policies of requiring search warrants
when these exceptions are not met.224  In the context of ICE home
raids, reports from communities across the country, confirmed by
large numbers of “collateral” arrests, reveal an enforcement
scheme in which entry into homes is obtained by coercion and en-
tire homes are searched for illegal immigrants.225  Despite this evi-
dence, ICE does not have a policy of requiring search warrants
when this type of enforcement is carried out.  If ICE continues to
conduct an enforcement program that operates by entering and
searching private homes for illegal immigrants, court-ordered
search warrants should be required to ensure compliance with the
Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
ICE’s targeting, entry and search of homes through initiatives
such as “Operation Return to Sender” and “Operation Community
Shield” raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns.  Because con-
stitutional standards for home entry have largely been developed
in the criminal context and immigration enforcement has tradition-
ally targeted workplaces and vehicles rather than homes, there is
no ready standard for determining when an immigration search
complies with the Fourth Amendment.  However, given the high
level of privacy interests, and that at present there are fewer pro-
tections for the home under “Operation Return to Sender” and
“Operation Community Shield” than exist for immigration work-
place raids or vehicle stops and searches, such an inquiry is
necessary.
Applying the balancing test used to determine Fourth Amend-
ment standards for civil law enforcement reveals that the Fourth
Amendment interests at stake when ICE raids a home are greater
than those at stake when ICE targets workplaces and vehicles.  On
balance, the government interests in conducting home raids for im-
migration enforcement are no greater than in other areas of immi-
gration enforcement.  Therefore, courts and DHS must require
ICE agents carrying out home raids to comply with the standards
in place in other immigration enforcement contexts: a reasonable
suspicion requirement for targeting, voluntary consent for entry,
and a judicial warrant or probable cause for searches.  ICE’s inter-
223. See supra notes 64, 84 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 63, 146, 167 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
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nal guidelines support application of these standards to the home
raid context by requiring valid consent for entry and probable
cause or a warrant for searches.
Reforms proposed here include following existing guidelines re-
garding valid consent, creating guidelines for initial targeting of
homes, and obtaining court-ordered warrants before entering
homes pursuant to initiatives such as “Operation Return to
Sender” and “Operation Community Shield.”  All of these reforms
would be beneficial.  However, given the importance of the privacy
interests at stake and the difficulty of enforcing compliance with
internal law enforcement guidelines, this Note argues that a court-
ordered search warrant is the most effective way to ensure that
ICE’s entry of homes to enforce immigration law complies with the
Fourth Amendment.
